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Abstract 
Walsh’s A Theory Of Magnitude (ATOM) contends that we represent magnitudes 
such as number, space, time and luminance on a shared metric, such that ‘more’ of 
one leads to the perception of ‘more’ of the other (e.g. Walsh, 2003). In support of 
ATOM, participants have been shown to judge intervals between stimuli that are more 
discrepant in luminance as having a longer duration than intervals between stimuli 
whose luminance differs by a smaller degree (Xuan, Zhang, He, & Chen, 2007). We 
tested the potential limits to the ability of luminance to influence duration perception 
by investigating the possibility that the luminance-duration relationship might be 
interrupted by a concurrent change in the colour of that luminance. We showed native 
Greek and native English speakers sequences of stimuli that could be either light or 
dark versions of green or blue. Whereas for both groups a shift in green luminance 
does not comprise a categorical shift in colour, for Greek speakers shifts between 
light and dark blue cross a colour category boundary (ghalazio and ble respectively). 
We found that duration judgements were neither interrupted nor inflated by a shift in 
colour category. These results represent the first evidence that the influence of 
luminance change on duration perception is resistant to interference from discrete 
changes within the same perceptual input.  
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1. Introduction 
A sense of time passing is a cornerstone of the human experience, yet unlike vision, 
hearing and such we have no ‘organ’ for it (Ornstein, 1969). Instead, when we 
subjectively measure ‘duration’, we are not really sampling objective time but rather 
measuring perceptual events (Pöppel, 2009). Research has made it abundantly clear 
that our subjective perception of duration is fallible, and even influenced in systematic 
fashion, by factors external to time itself (see Bueti & Walsh, 2009; Droit-Volet & 
Gil, 2009, for reviews). For example, clusters of more numerous stimuli are perceived 
to last longer than fewer stimuli (Alards-Tomalin, Walker, Kravetz, & Leboe-
McGowan, 2015; Dormal, Seron, & Pesenti, 2006; Xuan, Zhang, He, & Chen, 2007), 
changing stimuli longer than unchanging stimuli (Poynter & Homa, 1983), larger 
numbers longer than smaller numbers (Alards-Tomalin et al., 2015; Oliveri et al., 
2008; Vicario, Pecoraro, Turriziani, Koch, Caltagirone, & Oliveri, 2008; Xuan, et al., 
2007), and brighter stimuli longer than dimmer stimuli (Xuan et al., 2007).  
One account for such findings is Walsh’s influential ‘A Theory of Magnitude’ 
(ATOM; for reviews see Bueti & Walsh, 2009; Walsh, 2003; Winter, Marghetis, & 
Matlock, 2015). ATOM proposes that there is a shared metric for representing 
magnitudes of time, space and number, as well as other codes such as luminance. This 
shared metric likely arose from the need to control actions. For example, throwing 
and catching require a judgment to be made about the size of the object 
(number/quantity) and the object’s velocity (an equation formed through spatial and 
temporal variables). Crucially, an effect of this shared metric is that the perception of 
‘more’ in one domain, such as number, leads to the perception of ‘more’ in another, 
such as duration. This overlap of magnitudes was then ‘scaled up’ to expand to other 
dimensions such as luminance through knowledge of number. 
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Crucially, ATOM designates specifically analogue format to the shared 
magnitude metric. The present experiment was designed to test the level of priority 
that the analogue metric proposed by ATOM actually receives. One test of this 
hypothesis is to see if this metric continues to process analogue information in the 
same way when that analogue change coincides with a simultaneous but non-analogue 
(i.e. discrete) change. Would changes in luminance continue to bias duration 
perception if the two stimuli that differed in luminance also differed in their colour 
category—a discrete- rather than analogue-level change—compared to a matched 
luminance change but without a colour change? Or would a shared magnitude 
processor cease to function in the same way, indicating that other, non-analogue 
features can have an impact? 
 
1.1 The Kappa effect and the effect of luminance on duration. 
 The effect of luminance on time perception is not limited to the duration of a 
stimulus but extends to the perception of the intervals between stimuli. Previous 
studies have shown that participants’ perception of the duration of the two intervals 
(AX and XB) in a three-stimulus ‘AXB’ sequence is influenced by the physical 
distance between the stimuli in question, such that if the AXB stimuli are light flashes 
and stimuli A and X are separated by a greater physical distance than X and B, the 
AX interval is more likely to be judged as temporally ‘long’ than XB, all else being 
equal. This perceptual illusion, known as the Kappa effect (e.g. Abe, 1935; Cohen, 
Hansel, & Sylvester, 1954; Sarrazin, Giraudo, Pailhouse, & Bootsma, 2004), has been 
extended to differences other than physical distance between stimuli. Xuan et al. 
(2007) found that participants were influenced by the luminance of stimuli when 
judging whether the intervals between them were long or short in duration, such that 
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more errors were made when the temporally longer interval was bounded by a 
relatively subtle change in luminance compared to the temporally shorter interval, and 
vice-versa. Similar results were found when the magnitude in question was not 
luminance but numerosity (number of dots in the display), number magnitude (Arabic 
numbers) and size (varying the size of squares). Since Xuan et al.’s study, the 
subjective ‘warping’ of time through the magnitudes of size and numerals has been 
replicated (Alards-Tomalin, Leboe-McGowan, Shaw, & Leboe-McGowan, 2014), and 
has been extended to magnitudes of auditory intensity (intervals bounded by tones 
that were closer in intensity were perceived to be shorter: Alards-Tomalin, Leboe-
McGowan, & Mondor, 2013), and even levels of colour saturation (Alards-Tomalin et 
al., 2014). Crucially, in all of these studies, participants knew that the properties of the 
stimuli were irrelevant to the task, but seemingly could not ignore the discrepancies in 
magnitude in these non-temporal dimensions. Xuan and colleagues suggested that 
their results support the ATOM proposal, whereas Alards-Tomalin et al. (2014) 
offered an alternative possibility; namely that stimuli that are perceived to be more 
proximal (e.g. 1 and 2) are more likely to be integrated for the purposes of efficient 
processing, and hence the intervals bounded by these integrated stimuli may be 
subjectively compressed. 
 
1.2. Language and duration perception. 
Categorical Perception (CP) occurs when a continuum is perceived to alter in 
a discrete and qualitative way at a category boundary (Harnad, 1987, cited in 
Roberson, Pak, & Hanley, 2008), and as such colours that fall within a category are 
perceived as more similar than colours from different categories, effectively 
‘distorting’ a continuum (Roberson, Davidoff, Davies, & Shapiro, 2005). What in 
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English would be considered ‘blue’ colour space is ‘split’ into two categories in 
Greek, ble (approximately equivalent to ‘dark blue’ in English), and ghalazio 
(approximately ‘light blue’) (Androulaki, Gômez-Pestaña, Mitsakis, Jover, Coventry, 
& Davies, 2006; Athanasopoulos, 2009). A blue stimulus that changes from light to 
dark or vice-versa therefore crosses a category boundary in Greek, inducing CP, but 
not in English. Crucially for the present experiment, this means that a change in the 
luminance of two blue stimuli could be manipulated to cross a category boundary for 
one group—Greek speakers—but not the other. As such, by presenting Greek 
speakers with changes in ‘blue’ luminance we could introduce a discrete change in the 
identity of that stimulus to coincide with the analogue change in luminance, but we 
could show precisely the same stimuli to English speakers and now the change would 
be perceived as belonging to one colour alone.  
Importantly, the ble/ghalazio distinction has also already been shown to 
produce CP in Greek speakers. Thierry, Athanasopoulos, Wiggett, Dering, and 
Kuipers (2009) recorded ERP data from Greek and English speakers while they 
watched sequences of light and dark blue and light and dark green stimuli. 
Participants were instructed to make occasional responses based on shape, and not 
their colour. Using visual mismatch negativity (vMMN) as a measure of pre-attentive 
change perception, Thierry and colleagues found larger vMMN for changes in blues 
than greens in the Greek speakers, but equivalent performance across both colours in 
the native English speakers. The researchers concluded that the results demonstrated 
an unconscious effect of linguistic categories on colour perception.  
Support for CP effects of colour terms comes also from behavioural 
experiments between speakers of other languages who show a similar division of the 
blue colour space into two separate basic terms. It has been shown that speakers of 
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Russian, which also divides the ‘blue’ colour space into two basic terms marking 
similar colour spaces to those in Greek, are faster to visually locate an ‘oddball’ light 
blue stimulus among a set of dark blues (or vice versa) than speakers of English 
(Winawer, Witthoft, Frank, Wu, Wade, & Boroditsky, 2007). Similar findings have 
been reported in Korean speakers, who distinguish between what in English would be 
termed ‘yellow-green’ and ‘green’ (Roberson et al., 2008). In both of these studies 
these results have proven to be strongest in, or unique to, presentation of stimuli in the 
right visual field and hence in receipt of privileged processing by the language regions 
of the brain in the left hemisphere, adding further weight to the argument that the 
colour CP effect has its source in acquired linguistic categories. 
 
1.3. The present experiment 
Xuan and colleagues (2007) looked at the effect of luminance on duration 
judgments in a population that views the changes in luminance as a continuum. We 
here test the robustness of ATOM’s predictions when language imposes a categorical 
boundary on the luminance dimension. Using a similar design to that adopted by 
Alards-Tomalin and colleagues (2014), we presented native Greek and native English 
speakers with AXB sequences of blue or green colour patches. Crucially, either the 
first (A) or last (B) patch in the sequence consisted of a ‘dark’ or ‘light’ version of the 
colour found in the other two stimuli in the triplet, meaning that one interval was 
always bounded by stimuli that changed in luminance, and one interval by stimuli that 
were identical. When these stimuli were blue, the change in luminance also 
introduced a categorical shift (a CP effect) in the colour term of that stimulus for the 
Greek speakers, but not for the English speakers. We hypothesised that, if luminance 
and duration magnitude share processing through a single, analogue metric, the effect 
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of luminance on duration should proceed regardless of the simultaneous occurrence of 
a discrete change in colour in the luminance input stream. Alternatively, if CP 
interferes in some way with the processing of the analogue luminance change, then 
we should see a difference in judgments of duration compared to trials where no CP 
was introduced.   
If CP effects do influence duration perception, the way in which they do so 
would also be informative as to the underlying processes that lead to the influence of 
magnitude on duration perception. Specifically, an underestimation of duration when 
CP occurs should arise if the ble/ghalazio interval causes the processing of luminance 
to be halted at the category border. Such a result would indicate an exception to the 
notion of luminance influencing duration, and impose a new constraint on the shared 
metric account. Alternatively, an overestimation of duration is what might be 
predicted if it is harder to integrate stimuli that come under different linguistic 
categories. Such a pattern would support the proposal that it is the integration of 
proximal stimuli that leads to temporal compression effects (e.g. Alards-Tomalin et 
al., 2014).  
We applied a number of controls to our design. Firstly, for any such effects to 
be truly the result of CP, they should occur only within the Greek-speaking group and 
not occur simultaneously in native English speakers, for whom the changes in blue 
luminance to not constitute a shift in colour category. Simultaneously, CP effects 
should occur only for blue stimuli, and not for green stimuli, for which both the 
English and Greek speakers use one basic category (‘prasino’ in Greek). Although we 
chose to recruit Greek speakers in the UK, it is well-known that a bilingual’s first 
language is always active (e.g. Marian & Spivey, 2003a, 2003b; Thierry & Wu, 2007; 
Wu & Thierry, 2010), and Greek speakers recruited in the UK (and after an average 
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18 months in the country) continue to show sensitivity to the ble/ghalazio boundary 
(Thierry et al., 2009). Recruiting participants of both languages from the same 
university allowed us to control for environmental factors that might have otherwise 
influenced our findings. However, since the category boundaries and focal colours of 
ble and ghalazio have been shown to shift with increased acculturation to an English-
language environment (Athanasopoulos, 2009; Athanasopoulos, Dering, Wiggett, 
Kuipers, & Thierry, 2010), we recruited twice as many native Greek speakers as 
native English speakers with a view to splitting the former into short- and long-stay 
groups and comparing these two groups to the native English speakers. This allowed 
us to test whether any effects of the ble/ghalazio boundary might be stronger in (or 
limited to) those native Greek speakers who had spent only a very short time in an 
English-speaking environment. Finally, we also included a block with symbolic 
number stimuli to verify that the ‘classic’ number/time link was also true for our 
sample of Greek and English speakers, and to test whether one group was perhaps 
intrinsically more susceptible to effects magnitude change on duration perception, 
such that any effects that we may have attributed to the crossing of a colour category 
boundary might instead be attributable to greater sensitivity to magnitude in Greek 
speakers than English speakers more generally. 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants and colour naming tasks 
We recruited 89 participants from the same UK university, of which 62 were 
native speakers of Greek and 28 native speakers of English. All were compensated 
financially for their time. Four failed to follow instructions and their data were 
discarded (3 Greek speakers, 1 English speaker). Four (1 English, 3 Greek) were 
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excluded for extreme outlying responses, one English speaker for evidence of a 
potential colour vision deficit, and two Greek speakers due to technical faults. All had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and colour vision (score of 15 or 16 out of 16 on 
the City University Colour Vision Test, 3rd edition, 1998).  
All the native Greek speakers bar one, whose data were excluded, named the 
light blue colour ghalazio and the dark blue colour ble in a simple forced choice task 
in which each blue was presented side-by-side on the screen. In addition to this task, 
all participants (native Greek and native English speakers) also performed a free-
choice naming task, in which they saw patches of the colours used presented in a 
fixed order (Light Green, Dark Blue, Dark Green, Light Blue) and were asked to 
name the colours in their first language. This task was performed as part of another 
experiment that was always completed on a different day, prior to the experiment 
described here. We included the free-choice task because it allowed us to examine 
whether any effects of crossing a ble/ghalazio boundary were modulated by whether 
these stimuli were also freely and preferentially associated with these terms rather 
than with similar, perhaps more literary alternatives (e.g. Greek equivalents of ‘sky’ 
or ‘cerulean’ for light blue). It is because we anticipated splitting the native Greek 
speakers into two groups not just on the basis of their length of stay (to check for any 
effects of acculturation), but also on the basis of their natural adherence to the 
ble/ghalazio terms for the stimuli, that we collected data from a sample of native 
English speakers of approximately half the size of the full Greek sample. 
Final group numbers were 20 native English speakers and 50 native Greek 
speakers. The Greek speakers (MAge = 23, range 18-33; 35 females) continued to use 
Greek on average 45% of the time and had spent on average 22 months in the UK 
(range 1-108months) at the time of testing. They typically began learning English at 
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the age of 9, and had a good level of English by self-report (M = 4.28/5, range 3-5). 
These Greek speakers resembled those in the study by Thierry and colleagues (2009); 
their sample of native Greek speakers had spent 18 months in the UK at the time of 
testing (they were also recruited from a UK university) and displayed sensitivity to 
the ble/ghalazio boundary. 
The English speakers (MAge = 28, range 18-47; 9 females) reported no 
knowledge of a second language that divided the light/dark blue border. All the 
English speakers used the words ‘green’ and ‘blue’ as head nouns for the relevant 
stimuli in the free choice naming task (5 who did not were discarded). All the native 
Greek speakers used prasino or related secondary terms which can be defined as types 
of prasino— lachani (‘lettuce’ n = 6) or kyparisi (‘cypress’ n = 1)— to describe the 
greens1 (5 who did not were discarded). Of these native Greek speakers, 19 also 
named the relevant blues ble and ghalazio in the free choice task. These Greek 
speakers were also allocated to a ‘Strong Category’ sub-group. The remaining 31 
Greek speakers named the blue stimuli in the free choice task using different terms, 
such as ble (n = 12) and mov (‘mauve’, n = 7) for the light blue stimulus, and mov (n 
= 3) for the dark blue stimulus. These participants were allocated to a ‘Weak 
Category’ subgroup. Comparing the results of these two groups and the native English 
speakers would allow us to establish whether any effects of the ble/ghalazio boundary 
                                                      
1 These terms are types of the basic category prasino in the same sense that ‘emerald’ 
or ‘lime’ are types of the basic category ‘green’. These terms are hence subsumed 
within the basic category terms prasino/green; they do not constitute a categorical 
shift in the way that ble and ghalazio do. 
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are strongest in, or limited to, those participants for whom the stimuli were 
particularly strongly associated with the labels in question. 
 
2.2. Materials and procedure 
All stimuli (colour patches and numerals) were presented using E-Prime 2.0 
software and a 32-bit colour and Nvidia graphics card on a 20” Mitsubishi Diamond 
Pro 2070 set to an 85Hz refresh rate with 1024x768 resolution. The monitor was 
switched on at least 30 minutes before testing for normal operating temperature to be 
achieved. Participants sat in darkness measured at less than .01 cd/m2 (measured with 
a Minolta LS-100) in the absence of light from the monitor, and used a centrally-
placed chinrest which maintained a constant distance from the screen of approx. 
60cm. An enforced ten-minute dark adaptation period with only the light of the 
monitor (grey screen) preceded the practice trials. A grey background was maintained 
throughout the experiment.  
 
2.3. Duration judgment task.  
Figure 1 displays the slides and possible AXB sequences used in the 
experiment. 
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Figure 1:  All possible AXB sequences for numbers and colours. For the 
numerals, the central ‘X’ stimulus was either 2 or 8, the choice of which created 
magnitude discrepancies of 1,7 or 7,1. For the blocks of colours, the luminance 
pattern could be either ‘same-change’ (first two slides identical, third a different 
luminance) or change-same (last two slides identical, first a different luminance). In 
the block of blue stimuli, a luminance change consisted of a colour category change 
for the Greek speakers only. 
 
Colours. Following Alards-Tomalin et al. (2014), each patch was ovular and 
subtended a visual angle of 17.4 x 10.9. Observed Yxy values, measured with a 
PhotoResearch Spectrascan PR670, are detailed in the Appendix. The colour stimuli 
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were generated from the same RGB co-ordinates as those used for light and dark 
blues and greens in Athanasopoulos et al. (2010) and Thierry et al. (2009). These 
colours had been selected for their cross-colour equivalence in luminance, their 
prototypicality as examples of the Greek categories for ble and ghalazio, and for the 
previous evidence that bilingual Greek-English speakers resident in the UK were 
sensitive to the distinction between them (Thierry et al., 2009). 
Numerals. Stimuli were presented centrally in Times New Roman font and 
subtended a visual angle of 3.1o x 5.7o. The numerals used were ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘8’ and ‘9’, 
and were presented in either ascending order (i.e. AXB = 1,2/8, 9) or descending 
order (i.e. AXB = 9, 2/8, 1), forming magnitude patterns (1-7 and 7-1). Trials were 
equally divided between ascending and descending orders, 1-7 and 7-1 magnitude 
patterns, and the eight interval differences.  
Trial procedure. Upon pressing the space bar, participants saw a fixation 
cross (500ms) before the three stimuli (AXB, each 200ms). As in Alards-Tomalin et 
al.’s (2014) experiment, intervals were calculated from the onset of the first slide (A) 
to the onset of the second (X), and the onset of the second (X) to the onset of the third 
(B). There were four ‘long-short’ interval duration patterns (785ms-635ms, 768ms-
651ms, 752ms-668ms, 735ms-685ms), and four ‘short-long’ (635ms-785ms, 651ms-
768ms, 668ms-752ms, 685ms-735ms). These eight patterns can be expressed in terms 
of the differences between the two interval durations (from short-long to long-short: -
150ms, -117ms, -84ms, -50ms, 50ms, 84ms, 117ms, 150ms). Total trial time 
excluding the fixation cross was always 1420ms. After viewing each AXB sequence 
participants were prompted by the command ‘press’ to judge whether the time elapsed 
between the first and second slides (AX) was longer or shorter than the duration 
between the second and third slides (XB). Participants pressed ‘L’ on the keyboard to 
 15 
indicate they perceived a ‘Long-Short’ pattern and ‘S’ for ‘Short-Long’. Though no 
time limit was imposed, the instructions were to do this as quickly and accurately as 
possible, and to ignore the stimuli themselves making their choice.  
Order of presentation. Numerals (N), greens (G) and blues (B) were 
presented in a blocked design with counterbalanced order (Of the 70 participants 
remaining following exclusions, 33% began with numerals, 30% with greens and 37% 
with blues), with 160 trials per block. Prior to beginning the task proper, participants 
completed a short practice session of 6 AXB sequences, all using the same stimuli 
that they were to see in the first experimental block, and all using the maximal 
interval duration difference of (+/-150ms). Feedback, both in terms of accuracy and 
speed of response, was provided during this practice, but never during the 
experimental blocks. 
 
2.4. Analyses 
Following the procedure used by Alards-Tomalin et al. (2014), we took the 
percentage of long-short responses as our dependent measure, which we analysed 
using repeated measures ANOVAs. In all cases, the data for each cell in these 
analyses were normally distributed (ps > .05 by Shapiro-Wilks tests) unless 
specifically highlighted in the text. There were no reported violations of the 
assumption of homogeneity in any test. Where Bayesian analyses were also 
conducted, we interpret the results in terms of the convention that meaningful 
evidence for a null result (i.e. a null that is sufficiently sensitive to suggest a 
meaningful test of the hypothesis rather than a null that is likely to be an artefact of 
low statistical power) requires a Bayes Factor (BF10) of <0.33 (Dienes, 2014). 
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3. Results 
The mean percentage of long-short responses for each interval and trial type for the 
entire sample (N = 70) is displayed in Table 1, and shows the expected pattern of a 
linear decline as the first interval becomes shorter relative to the second. This made 
clear that participants were indeed engaged in the task. Since further analyses would 
not yield any relevant information for our hypotheses concerning luminance and 
colour, we thus proceeded with our main analyses collapsing over these eight 
intervals. 
 
Table 1. Percentage of long-short responses by interval (positive numbers indicate 
first interval was longer than the second) and trial type. 
 Colours Numerals 
 Same-Change Change-Same Small-Big Big-Small 
Interval Green Blue Green Blue   
+150ms 64 66 66 68 67 67 
+117ms 64 60 64 65 60 64 
+84ms 56 57 64 63 55 60 
+50ms 52 54 58 57 54 54 
-50ms 38 38 48 48 41 48 
-84ms 38 36 43 40 38 42 
-117ms 33 30 39 39 35 36 
-150ms 30 26 38 31 34 34 
 
 
3.1 Does crossing a colour category influence duration perception between blues 
and greens in Greek speakers? 
We first analysed the data from the full complement of Greek speakers (n = 
50). Each of these participants named the light blue stimulus ghalazio and the dark 
blue stimulus ble in the two-choice test. 
We conducted a 2: Colour (Green vs. Blue) x 2: Luminance (Same-Change vs. 
Change-Same) repeated-measures ANOVA. The results are displayed in panel A of 
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Figure 2. As predicted, the analysis revealed a main effect of Luminance, F(1, 49) = 
11.532, MSE = 1.5, p = .001, ηp2  = .191, with more long-short responses given when 
the first interval coincided with a change in luminance (M = 53.3%, 95% CI [50.3, 
56.2]), than when no change in luminance was perceived (M = 47.4%, 95% CI [44.4, 
50.4]). There was no main effect of Colour, F(1, 49) = 0.098, MSE = 1.0, p = .756, ηp2  
= .002; participants gave a similar proportion of long-short responses for both greens 
(M = 50.6%, 95% CI [47.4, 53.7]) and blues (M = 50.1%, 95% CI [47.7,52.5]). 
Crucially, there was no interaction, F(1, 49) = 0.108, MSE = 0.7, p = .744, ηp2  = .002. 
Native Greek speakers perceived the interval between stimuli that changed in 
luminance to be longer than the interval between stimuli that did not change, but there 
was no evidence that a change in colour category modulated this effect. To test the 
strength of this null interaction, we applied Bayesian analyses to the data. Crucially, 
the analysis found that the data were approximately 5 times more likely under the null 
hypothesis that there was no Colour x Luminance interaction, BF10 = 0.211, 
supporting the interpretation of a meaningful null according to Dienes (2014) 
criterion. 
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Figure 2. Results of analyses for colour stimuli (with standard error bars) 
 
3.2 Are effects of the ble/ghalazio boundary restricted to short-stay Greek speakers? 
If the total sample of 50 Greek speakers failed to show any influence of 
crossing a colour category boundary when making duration judgments, this could be 
because some had spent sufficient time in the UK for this boundary to become 
blurred. To test this possibility, we allocated the native Greek speakers into short- and 
long-stay groups by median split, and added the native English speakers as a third 
group in the analysis. The ‘Long-Stay’ group (n = 25) had spent an average of 40 
months in the UK at the time of testing (95% CI [28,50]). By contrast, the ‘Short-
Stay’ group (n = 25) had spent an average of only 4 months in the UK (95% CI [2,6]). 
We reasoned that if the ble/ghalazio border was more influential in those participants 
who had spent the least time in an English-language environment, then the effect of 
crossing the ble/ghalazio border should be different in the short-stay group relative to 
the long-stay group and the native English speakers, as well as relative to matched 
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within-category changes in greens. Evidence for such an effect would thus be 
supported by a significant three-way interaction between Group (English vs. Greek 
Short-Stay vs. Greek Long-Stay), Colour (Green vs. Blue), and Luminance (Same-
Change vs. Same-Change).  
With the sole exception of green same-change trials in the Greek Short-Stay 
group (p = .022), the data did not deviate from normality, and hence we opted to 
proceed with parametric tests2. We conducted a 3: Group x 2: Colour x 2: Luminance 
mixed-design ANOVA with repeated measures over the last two factors. The results 
are displayed in panels B, C and F of Figure 2. The analysis revealed only one 
significant effect; Luminance, F(1, 67) = 17.062, MSE = 0.1, p < .001, ηp2  = .203. 
Participants gave more long-short responses for intervals bounded by changes in 
luminance (M = 51.7%, 95% CI [49.1, 54.2]), than for intervals bounded by stimuli 
that did not change at all (M = 46.2%, 95% CI [43.7, 48.7]). There was a marginally 
significant main effect of Group, F(2, 67) = 2.563, MSE = 3.2, p = .085, ηp2  = .071, 
with post-hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni correction finding that the Greek 
Short-Stay group made slightly more frequent long-short responses than the English 
group (p = .088), with no other contrasts yielding significant outcomes (ps > .4). Most 
crucially, however, was the absence of any evidence of a significant three-way 
interaction, F(2, 67) = 1.524, MSE = 0.6, p = .225, ηp2  = .044. Crucially, Bayesian 
                                                      
2 Given that the data for one cell in the Short-Stay group was not normally distributed, 
we conducted a parallel non-parametric test for this group alone. A Wilcoxon signed-
rank test found no difference in the size of the increase in long-short responses for a 
change in green or a change in blue (p = .306), supporting the null finding in the 
parametric tests. 
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analyses found that the data were four times more likely under the null hypothesis that 
there is no three-way interaction, BF10 = 0.257, again showing meaningful support for 
the null by Dienes (2014) criterion. No other main effects or interactions reached 
significance: Colour, F(1, 67) = 0.354, MSE = 0.8, p = .354, ηp2  = .013; Colour x 
Group, F(2, 67) = 0.594, MSE = 0.9, p = .555, ηp2  = .017; Luminance x Group, F(2, 
67) = 0.095, MSE = 1.2, p = .909, ηp2  = .003; Colour x Magnitude, F(2, 67) = 0.000, 
MSE = 0.6, p = .979, ηp2  = .000.  
  
3.3 Are effects of the ble/ghalazio boundary restricted to those who freely associate 
the stimuli with these terms? 
Another possibility is that only those Greek speakers who named the blue stimuli ble 
and ghalazio when no restrictions were applied to their colour naming choices at all 
will show an effect of crossing the ble/ghalazio boundary. For these participants, the 
stimuli clearly and uncontroversially belonged to these categories. We applied the 
same reasoning to this analysis as we did for the analysis incorporating length of stay, 
namely that a three-way interaction Group (English vs. Greek Strong Category vs. 
Greek Weak Category), Colour (Green vs. Blue), and Luminance (Same-Change vs. 
Same-Change) would support this hypothesis.  
We conducted a 3: Group (English vs. Greek Weak Category vs. Greek Strong 
Category) x 2: Colour (Green vs. Blue) x 2: Luminance (Same-Change vs. Same-
Change) mixed-design ANOVA with repeated measures over the last two factors 
again. The results are displayed across figures D, E and F in Figure 2. The analysis 
revealed only a significant main effect of Luminance, F(1, 67) = 16.314, MSE = 1.2, p 
< .001, ηp2  = .196, indicating that participants gave more long-short responses for 
intervals bounded by stimuli that changed in luminance (M = 51.6%, 95% CI [49.0, 
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54.2]), than stimuli that did not change (M = 46.1%, 95% CI [43.5, 48.7]). Again, no 
other main effects or interactions reached significance: Colour, F(1, 67) = 0.749, MSE 
= 0.9, p = .390, ηp2  = .011; Group, F(2, 67) = 1.611, MSE = 3.3, p = .207, ηp2  = .046; 
Colour x Group, F(2, 67) = 0.292, MSE = 0.9, p = .748, ηp2  = .009; Luminance x 
Group, F(2, 67) = 0.001, MSE = 1.2, p = .921, ηp2  = .166; Colour x Luminance, F(2, 
67) = 0.020, MSE = 0.6, p = .887, ηp2  = .000). Crucially, there was no three-way 
interaction, F(2, 67) = 0.370, MSE = 0.6, p = .692, ηp2  = .011. Again, Bayesian 
analyses found that the data were approximately six times more likely under the null 
hypothesis that there was no three-way interaction, BF10 = 0.158, which once more 
exceeded Dienes’ (2014) suggested criterion for a meaningful null result.  
 
3.4. Additional analyses 
The results of our analyses pointed strongly to there being no effect of 
crossing a colour category boundary on duration judgments. Since we were explicitly 
exploring null results, we conducted three final post-hoc tests in which we analysed 
the data from each of the native English speakers, the Greek Short-Stay group, and 
the Greek Strong-Category group separately using repeated-measures ANOVAs 
(Luminance x Colour). Note that we included these analyses only for completeness, 
since further tests were not mandated by the results of the previous ANOVAs. Here 
we report only the results relating to whether there was an interaction at the within-
group level between Luminance and Colour, which would indicate that a change in 
the luminance of blues influenced duration judgments differently from a change in the 
luminance of greens. The full results can be found in the supplemental materials. 
The analysis of the native English speakers (n = 20) revealed no interaction, 
F(1, 19) = 0.417, MSE = 0.4, p = .526, ηp2  = .021. Bayesian analyses found that the 
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data were approximately twice as likely under the null hypothesis that there was no 
Colour x Luminance interaction, BF10 = 0.565. The same analysis for the Greek 
Short-Stay group also found no Colour x Luminance interaction, F(1, 24) = 6.107, 
MSE = 1.1, p = .29, ηp2  = .047, and again Bayesian analyses found that the data were 
two times more likely under the null that there is no interaction, BF10 = 0.414. Finally, 
the results of the same analysis with the Greek Strong Category group also found no 
Colour x Luminance interaction, F(1, 18) = 0.134, MSE = 0.3, p = .719, ηp2  = .007, 
and Bayesian analyses found that the data were more than three times more likely 
under the null that there is no interaction, BF10 = 0.305, meeting Dienes’ (2014) 
criterion even in this more restricted sample. 
Next, we looked at the data from the blocks with numerals. Since we found 
strong support for the null that the ble/ghalazio boundary in fact had no special effect 
on duration perception, the analysis with numeral magnitude is largely included here 
for completeness. In order to provide the best comparison with our previous analyses, 
we conducted two mixed-design ANOVAs, in each case with Magnitude (One-Seven 
vs. Seven-One) as the within-subjects factor, but in one analysis the between-subjects 
factor Group was the same as in the previous analysis for length of stay (English vs. 
Greek Short-Stay vs. Greek Long-Stay), and in the other it was the same as the 
previous analysis for colour naming choices (English vs. Greek Strong Category vs. 
Greek Weak Category). The results of both analyses are displayed in Figure 3. In both 
analyses, there was a significant main effect of Magnitude: analysis by length of stay, 
F(1, 67) = 6.880, MSE = 0.4, p = .011, ηp2  = .093; analysis by naming choices, F(1, 
67) = 6.840, MSE = 0.4, p = .011, ηp2  = .093, with more long-short responses when 
the first interval was bounded by numerals that differed by seven steps than by one 
step alone: analysis by length of stay (MDiff = 2.7%, 95% CI [0.1, 4.7]); analysis by 
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naming choices (MDiff = 2.7%, 95% CI [0.1, 4.8]). In both analyses there was no main 
effect of Group: analysis by length of stay, F(2, 67) = 1.966, MSE = 2.3, p = .148, ηp2  
= .055; analysis by naming choices, F(2, 67) = 1.918, MSE = 2.3, p = .011, ηp2  = 
.054. In both cases there was also no evidence of any interaction: analysis by length of 
stay, F(2, 67) = 0.257, MSE = 0.4, p = .774, ηp2  = .008; analysis by naming patterns, 
F(2, 67) = 0.202, MSE = 0.4, p = .817, ηp2  = .006. In sum, the results from the blocks 
with numerals replicated the effect found by Alards-Tomalin and colleagues (2014), 
and patterned similarly to the results from the blocks that manipulated luminance.  
 
 
Figure 3. Results of analyses with numerals (with standard error bars). 
 
4. Discussion 
In the present experiment, we tested the limits of ATOM’s notion of a shared 
and analogue metric for number, luminance and duration. We presented Greek and 
English speakers with a duration judgment task in which they had to indicate whether 
they perceived one interval to be either longer or shorter than the other. Consistent 
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with previous research (Xuan et al., 2007), we found that changes in luminance 
influenced participants’ judgments of duration, such that intervals bounded by stimuli 
that changed in luminance were perceived to last longer than intervals bounded by 
stimuli that did not change. Crucially, however, we found no evidence that crossing a 
category boundary had any effect on duration perception. Greek speakers showed no 
difference in performance when they perceived a change in blue, which for them 
consisted simultaneously of a change in colour category, relative to when they saw a 
change in green, or relative to changes in blue in native English speakers. Breaking 
down the Greek participants by their time spent in the UK, we also found no effect of 
acculturation to an English-language environment on performance on these stimuli. 
Similarly, and perhaps most tellingly, even those Greek speakers who preferentially 
associated the terms ble and ghalazio to the relevant stimuli in a completely free-
choice naming task showed no special effect of crossing this category boundary. 
Overall, these results therefore support the hypothesis of a shared analogue 
representation of luminance and duration that is impervious to discrete changes 
contained within magnitude being perceived.  
 Although there are indeed many instances where language and cross-linguistic 
differences have been shown to influence cognitive processes, including in the 
temporal domain (see Athanasopoulos, Samuel, & Bylund, 2017, and Winter et al., 
2015, for reviews), it would appear that there are constraints on this influence. The 
present results suggest that, to influence time perception, language may need to be 
specifically temporal language (e.g. related to ‘time’ vocabulary, see for example 
Casasanto, 2008), or alternatively may not be able to influence shared magnitude 
processing at all.  
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Overall, we believe our results are consistent with the suggestion in ATOM 
that there is a shared metric for luminance and duration. The present study also lends 
some support to the additional contention that this shared metric is common to all 
humans, and independent of experience (Walsh, 2003). Our results demonstrate that 
this analogue metric is not susceptible to interference from ‘learned’ linguistic 
categories. It could be that, as ATOM proposes, this shared metric is therefore 
available ‘from birth’. In support of this possibility, there is evidence that very young 
infants and even neonates just a few hours old show evidence of shared magnitude 
processing (e.g. de Hevia, Izard, Coubart, Spelke & Steri, 2014; Lourenço & Longo, 
2010; Srinivasan & Carey, 2010).  
Our results would appear not to support the suggestion by Alards-Tomalin and 
colleagues (2014) that it is the integration of more proximal stimuli (e.g. 1, 2) that 
may underlie duration judgment effects in such tasks. Since the two blue stimuli 
should be more distinct for the native Greek speakers than for the native English 
speakers (cf. Thierry et al., 2009), and experientially we would expect that Greek 
speakers would have had many more occasions in their lifetime to distinguish 
between the two blue stimuli given that word choice represents a more fundamental 
decision in this population, we should have found that Greek speakers found it more 
difficult to integrate these categories, but we found no such evidence  
Although there are other explanations of the effects of magnitude on duration 
judgments, it is important to note that these accounts were designed with the duration 
of stimuli themselves and not the intervals between them in mind. For example, the 
‘oddball’ effect predicts that stimuli that are perceived as more distinct or less 
predictable in their context are more likely to have their duration of presentation 
overestimated (e.g. Schindel, Rowlands, and Arnold, 2011; Tse, Intriligator, Rivest, & 
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Cavanagh, 2004). The ‘contrast’ account posits that the magnitude of the contrast 
between the luminance of a stimulus and the luminance of its background may 
explain duration overestimation (e.g. Matthews, Stewart, & Wearden, 2011). The 
neural amplification hypothesis posits (among other predictions) that stimulus 
repetition leads to a decrease in neural response and hence a concomitant decrease in 
perceived duration (e.g. Eagleman, 2008; Pariyadath, & Eagleman, 2007, 2012). 
Although it is true that magnitude effects in AXB tasks rely on characteristics of the 
stimuli bounding the intervals, and hence such theories may indeed be relevant, at this 
stage we feel that there is no theoretical framework within these theories that makes 
any direct prediction about effects on empty intervals3. As a result, we do not argue 
that the results from the present study either support or contradict such hypotheses. 
Nevertheless, what is clear is that if such effects were impacted by the processes 
outlined above, they also did not show any evidence of interacting with CP.  
Could our findings be explained by features of our sample of Greek speakers? 
It is certainly true that the Greek speakers in this experiment had a high level of 
English since they were studying in the UK at the time of testing (mean 4.28/5 self-
reported proficiency). However, and as mentioned earlier, there is good evidence to 
suggest that our first language influences our processing even when we are engaged in 
                                                      
3 It may be worth noting here that since the grey background on which the stimuli 
were displayed was closer in luminance to the darker colours than the lighter colours, 
it is unlikely that the contrast account could explain the effects of luminance on 
duration judgments here, since the effect was found regardless of whether the 
stimulus became more similar (i.e. darker) or more distinct (i.e. lighter) than the 
background (see supplemental materials for details of this analysis). 
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an explicitly second-language context; we cannot ‘turn it off’ (e.g. Marian & Spivey, 
2003a, 2003b; Thierry & Wu, 2007; Wu & Thierry, 2010). Most relevant to the 
present study are the findings of Thierry et al.’s (2009) study that we described 
earlier, but also our own evidence that Greek speakers who had spent on average just 
four months in the UK performed no differently from those who had spent 40 months 
in the country. In sum, previous studies suggest that the Greek speakers’ first 
language colour terms can permeate into tasks conducted in a second-language 
environment, and our own data together suggests that the degree of acculturation (or 
indeed non-acculturation) to an English-speaking environment does not modulate the 
effect of luminance change.  
Secondly, our analyses of the specific naming choices of participants ruled out 
the possibility that we found no effect of the ble/ghalazio boundary because Greek 
speakers may not agree on which colours are best represented by the terms. All 50 
native Greek speakers that were included in the present study named the two stimuli 
ble and ghalazio in a two-alternative forced-choice task. Nevertheless, the most 
stringent test is to look at the evidence from those Greek speakers who not only 
named the colours correctly in the forced-choice task, but also those who gave the 
same terms when no restrictions on their choices were applied. Crucially, there was 
no evidence that these participants performed differently when crossing this colour 
category boundary compared to when they did not, relative to both greens and to the 
other Greek speakers and native English speakers. It is worth pointing out also that 
conducting and using a free-choice naming test is a particularly stringent criterion that 
goes beyond what is typically found in other studies in the field. In sum, regardless of 
whether one prefers to rely on the full sample of Greek speakers or the subset who 
demonstrate the strongest possible adherence to the labels crucial to our hypothesis, 
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there was no evidence of an effect of colour category boundaries on duration 
judgments.  
Would it be reasonable to expect an effect of colour on duration judgments if 
we presented the stimuli to the right visual field, and hence favoured the categorical 
processing of colour in the language regions of the brain in the left hemisphere? This 
approach has proved fruitful in other studies of the categorical perception of colour 
(e.g. Roberson et al., 2008; Winawer et al., 2008). In these studies, the finding that 
participants are faster to locate an across-category target in the right visual field 
provided evidence that the idiosyncratic colour categories of language aided target 
location. However, these studies were concerned with the ability to locate a unique 
stimulus among competitors. It is clear from the results of the numeral stimuli in the 
present study, as well as previous studies (e.g. Alards-Tomalin et al., 2014) that 
participants have no problem perceiving the stimuli in AXB tasks, as evidenced by 
the fact that numerals can and do influence duration perception in the absence of 
lateralised presentation. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a convincing argument to 
suggest that categorical differences can only be perceived if they are not presented 
centrally. For example, if instead of a light blue followed by two dark blues we had 
presented an image of a dog followed by two cats, it is clear that participants would 
recognise that the stimuli change categorically also in binocular view. Thus, our 
manipulation would not require the lateralisation of stimuli in order for any effect of 
the stimuli to occur. 
 
4. Conclusion 
According to ATOM, number, luminance, spatial and temporal codes share 
the same analogue magnitude metric, and hence behavioural experiments should 
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uncover evidence of cross-talk between codes. We found evidence that this process is 
impervious to discrete changes in the stimuli from which the magnitude finds it 
source. As a result, the findings of the present study lend support to the suggestion 
that analogue luminance data is neither interrupted nor distorted by simultaneous and 
discrete (digital) shifts in the same input stream.  
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Appendix 
Colour measurements. Observed Yxy values for colour stimuli and grey 
background. The Y indicates the level of luminance of that stimulus. 
 Y x y 
Light Green 35.73 .27 .38 
Dark Green 9.62 .26 .43 
Light Blue 35.48 .24 .26 
Dark Blue 9.15 .22 .23 
Grey (background) 14.21 .31 .33 
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